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Abstract— While IPv6 is increasingly being deployed in net-
works, including ISPs, the need to monitor and manage the
associated protocols increases. In this paper we focus on the
Neighbor Discovery Protocol and we motivate the importance to
monitor it. We also present our approach for this task together
with the functionalities we provide and the software, NDPMon,
that we developed.
I. INTRODUCTION
In most IP networks, administrators deploy several tools to
manage and monitor their networks, either to collect measure-
ments about the performance, or to ensure the integrity and
security of them. One of these tools is ArpWatch 1 which
monitors the pairing between IPv4 and Ethernet addresses,
and ARP [1] activities. This simple tool is very useful in IPv4
networks to know about the hosts present on the network,
discover the new ones appearing, or detect misconfigurations
or misbehaviors.
The exponential growth of the Internet in the nineties
brought several problems, due to drawbacks in the IPv4
protocol. To overcome these limits, a new version of the IP
protocol, IPv6 [2] was defined, bringing with it advanced built-
in services. One of the objectives of IPv6 was to ease the ad-
dressing of the hosts, the discovery of network components...
To achieve this goal, the Neighbor Discovery Protocol [3] was
defined. This protocol does not only replace ARP, it is more
complex and offers different services.
As IPv6 is being deployed on more and more networks, the
same needs in terms of management and monitoring appear.
In the last years, many studies have been made, and robust
tools for monitoring and configuring IPv6 networks have been
developed. However, some lacks subsist in the management
plane, including the monitoring of the Neighbor Discovery
Protocol.
In this paper, we present an adaptation of the ArpWatch
model for IPv6. The paper is structured as following. Section
2 presents the Neighbor Discovery Protocol and its vulnerabil-
ities. In Section 2 we highlight the interest in monitoring this
protocol. Section 4 describes our approach and the monitoring
architecture we propose. The NDPMon software that we
implemented is detailed in Section 5. Before concluding, we
give an overview of our future work.
1http://ee.lbl.gov/
II. NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY PROTOCOL
In this section, we will first present the Neighbor Discovery
Protocol, and then describe the vulnerabilities of this protocol
and the attacks which can be done against it.
A. Presentation
The Neighbor Discovery Protocol [3] is part of the
ICMPv6 [4] protocol. It is used by IPv6 nodes to interact
with each others via ICMPv6 messages, and replaces ARP [1],
IPv4 Router Discovery [5], IPv4 Redirection, and offers new
functionalities. The most known one is the IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration [6], which makes possible for a
node to configure the addresses and routes on an interface
automatically, simply by connecting it to the network link.
The Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) algorithm [6]
ensures during this procedure that the address assigned on
the interface is not already used on the network.
But in order to communicate, the link-layer’s address is not
sufficient for a node, it needs several types of informations.
Different procedures exist within the Neighbor Discovery
Protocol to discover these particular parameters and/or options:
• Router Discovery: hosts locate the on-link routers,
• Prefix discovery: hosts discover the set of on-link IPv6
prefixes,
• Address Resolution: IPv6 addresses are resolved to their
data link-layer address (see figure 1),
• Next-Hop Determination: used to determine the IPv6
address (link local or global address) of the neighbor
which acts as gateway for the given destination; it can
be a router or the node itself,
• Neighbor Unreachability Detection: check the reachabil-
ity of a neighbor,
• Redirect: routers inform a hosts that a better first hop
exist to reach a given destination.
The Neighbor Discovery Protocol defines five messages
which are used during these procedures:
• Router Solicitation: sent by a node which wants to
configure itself, to ask information about the on-link
routers and prefixes,
• Router Advertisement: sent periodically, or in response
to a Router Solicitation, by a router; contains the default
gateway’s address, the router’s validity, the list of IPv6
Fig. 1. Address Resolution
prefixes the router handles, MTU, Mobile IPv6 [7] op-
tions...
• Neighbor Solicitation: sent by a node to query a neigh-
bor (physical address, reachability, or availability of an
address during the DAD),
• Neighbor Advertisement: sent periodically by a node, or
in answer to a Neighbor Solicitation, in order to advertise
the physical address of an interface,
• Redirect: used by routers to advertise a better route.
B. Vulnerabilities and Attacks
The Neighbor Discovery Protocol, as it was defined, is
vulnerable to different types of threats and attacks [8]. There
are three main types of threats.
• Redirect attacks: a malicious node redirects packets away
from the receiver to another node on the link,
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks: a malicious node pre-
vents communication between the node under attack and
all other nodes, or a specific destination address,
• Flooding DoS attacks: a malicious node redirects other
hosts’ traffic to the victim.
A Redirect attack can lead to a DoS, if the packets redirected
to a node are dropped, or forwarded to another host. These
attacks can be performed on purpose by a malicious node, but
they can also simply reflect a host’s misconfiguration.
We are going to describe more precisely the attacks in the
following subsections, organizing them in three types: non
routing related attacks, routing related attacks and remotely
exploitable and replay attacks.
1) Non routing related threats: These are attacks against
the ”pure” Neighbor Discovery functions.
By spoofing Neighbor Advertisements, a malicious node can
make the Duplicate Address Detection process fail for a host
which is trying to assign itself an address with autoconfigu-
ration, and the host will stop to claim that address. That host
may never be able to obtain a valid IPv6 address.
Sending spoofed advertisements can also overwrite the
neighbors’ caches on nodes. Then, some packets may be sent
to the wrong destination, which leads to services DoS.
When a service or host is not responding, the Neighbor
Unreachability Detection is launched, to check the reachability
of the node. A Neighbor Solicitation is sent to the node, and
a Neighbor Advertisement is expected in return. A malicious
node can keep sending fake Neighbor Advertisements. If the
procedure fails, the upper-layer’s traffic is stopped, but here
it wouldn’t be the case, as the host would still be considered
as reachable. This may introduce infinite delays to detect
services’ outage.
2) Routing related threats: These threats are relevant to
router discovery or router related mechanisms.
If a malicious node sends a spoofed Router Advertisement,
hosts may select the attacker as default router. Thus, the
attacker can siphon off traffic from hosts, or mount man in
the middle attacks (see figure 2). If it then forwards the traffic
to a legitimate router, this can be completely transparent for the
hosts. If an invalid prefix is advertised in the advertisement,
it may be used by hosts for autoconfiguration. As a result,
an invalid source address may be used, and the packets sent
by the misconfigured hosts may never reach the destination.
If the spoofed prefix is a valid prefix, but from another link
or network, the hosts will believe this prefix is on-link, and
will never send packets for this prefix to the default router,
and thus, this prefix will be unreachable for the nodes. Such
a spoofed router Advertisement may also duplicate the ones
from the legitimate router, but modify other parameters, such
as disabling autoconfiguration for hosts or specifying a hop
limit too small for packets’ routing. The default router can also
be ”killed”, either by launching a classical DoS on the default
router, and spoofing advertisements, so that the nodes believe
all the destinations are on-link, or by duplicating the Router
Advertisements with a router lifetime of zero. Finally, the
attacker may send spoofed Redirect messages with a legitimate
source address, to send packets for a given destination to any
link-layer address on the link. This address can be invalid,
as long as the attacker responds to Neighbor Unreachability
Detection probes.
3) Replay attacks and remotely exploitable threats: All
Neighbor Discovery messages are prone to replay attacks. An
attacker which is able to capture valid messages, will be able
to replay them later, even if the messages are cryptographically
protected, unless the cryptographic mechanism is protected
itself.
A malicious node can also perform a classical DoS against
the Neighbor Discovery Protocol. If it generates well formated
IPv6 addresses for a given prefix, and sends packets to these,
the last hop router will have to resolve these addresses by
sending Neighbor Solicitation packets. If the frequency is high
enough, a new host entering the target network may not be
able to perform autoconfiguration, as the router will be busy
resolving the fake addresses.
Fig. 2. Redirect traffic with spoofed RA
III. SECURING OR MONITORING ?
Section II-B highlighted some vulnerabilities in the Neigh-
bor Discovery Protocol. As some of them are quite easy to
exploit, there is a real need to secure the various functions in
this protocol.
To respond to this need, SEND, SEcure Neighbor Discov-
ery [9], was defined. A new set of Neighbor Discovery options
is used, in order to protect Neighbor Discovery messages.
Besides these new options, this solution introduces several new
components in the classical neighbor discovery architecture.
The first component is certificate paths. Each host on the
link must be configured with an anchor to which the router
has a certificate path before selecting it as its default router.
Certificate Path Solicitation and Advertisement messages are
used to discover these paths.
To make sure the sender of a Neighbor Discovery message is
the owner of the claimed address, Cryptographically Generated
Addresses [10] are used. Before claiming an address, all hosts
generate a public-private key pair. A new option, the CGA
option, is used to carry the public key and its associated
parameters. Figure 3 shows how these addresses are generated.
The RSA Signature option is used to secure all Neighbor
Fig. 3. Cryptographic Addresses Generation
and Router Discovery messages. This option protects the
integrity of the message and authenticates the identity of their
sender. The authority of a public key is established either
with the authorization delegation process, by using certificates,
or through the address ownership proof mechanism, with
Cryptographically Generated Addresses, or even with both.
To prevent the replay attacks, the options Timestamp and
Nonce have been introduced. The Timestamp option provides
replay protection without any previously established state or
sequence number. When the messages are used in solicita-
tion/advertisement pairs, the Nonce option is used.
But this infrastructure is complex to deploy, especially
because of the usage of certificates. Moreover the usage of
Cryptographically Generated Addresses introduces a longer
treatment time for the Neighbor Discovery messages, which
can be harmful, for example if Mobile IPv6 is deployed.
Finally, there are not many implementations of SEND. for
these reasons, SEND has not been deploy widely on the
Internet yet.
However, if IPv6 is known as easily vulnerable and open
to attacks, it will not be deployed neither. For IPv4 networks,
ARP is not secured, but a tool, ArpWatch, for monitoring this
protocol is widely used. This tool monitors the ARP activities,
and sends alerts if required. The main advantage to the secure
version, is that this tool is easy to deploy, and does not required
an architecture as complex as SEND’s one.
For these reasons, we decided to propose a monitoring
architecture for the Neighbor Discovery Protocol, which we
will present in the section IV. This tool will detect unexpected
behaviors of the Neighbor Discovery Protocol and send reports
to the administrator or to another management application
which will be in charge of taking the required action on the
network.
IV. OUR MONITORING ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we will present our proposal for monitoring
the Neighbor Discovery Protocol. Basically, the idea is to
implement an IPv6 version of ArpWatch. But, as the Neighbor
Discovery Protocol is more complex than ARP, some other
functionalities are required. We will first describe ArpWatch
and how we used it as a reference to define our monitoring
architecture, and then we will present the additional function-
alities in our proposal.
A. Monitor the Neighbor Discovery Activities
ArpWatch has been used as a reference to define the
monitoring architecture. It was developed by the Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory. Its role is to monitor ARP’s
activity. By analyzing ARP packets, it maintains up-to-date
a cache in which are stored the pairing between IPv4 and
Ethernet addresses for all hosts on the link. A Timestamp
is associated to each entry in this cache, which enables a
monitoring over the time of host’s activity. When an ARP
packet is captured, it is compared to the information in the
cache, and if a suspicious behavior, or special activities (a
new station has appeared on the network) is detected, a report
is sent to the administrator. These reports are sent via syslog
and mail for the most important ones.
Our first objective is to define a tool which would perform
the same monitoring tasks, but for IPv6. This tool is in charge
of monitoring the Neighbor Discovery Protocol’s activities
and maintains up-to-date a neighbor database which contains
the correspondences between IPv6 and Ethernet addresses,
alongside with a Timestamp. When a Neighbor Discovery
packet is captured, the content is compared to the entries in the
database. Usually, in IPv4, only one address was assigned to
an interface. In IPv6, multihoming is one of the key features,
for Network Renumbering [11] for example. When defining
the neighbors’ cache entries, we have to take this specificity
into account. In the same way than ArpWatch, activities
and suspicious behaviors raise alerts and reports. All these
alerts are sysloged, and depending on the syslog daemon’s
configuration, they can be sent to a remote station. The most
severe ones, namely the suspicious activities, raise alerts which
are sent by mail to a defined address, by using an external Mail
Transfer Agent (MTA).
The Neighbor Discovery activities monitored by the tool
are:
• new station: a new Ethernet address appears on the
network, a new node has appeared
• new activity: the source node had no activity during the
last month
• bogon: the IPv6 source address is not local to the link
• ethernet mismatch: the Ethernet address specified in the
ICMP option is not the same than the Ethernet source
address of the packet
• changed ethernet address: a node changed its Ethernet
address while keeping the same IPv6 address
• flip flop: a node is switching between two different
Ethernet addresses
• reused address: a node is re-using an old Ethernet address
The tool is aimed to being deployed on each subnet or link
of the network, as shown in figure 4. It integrates a learning
phase. During this phase, it builds the neighbors’ database by
capturing the Neighbor Discovery messages, while not sending
any report. The tool makes the assumption that, when it enters
this phase, the network is healthy and that all the activities are
legitimate. Once this phase is over, the tool can be restarted
in monitoring mode.
Fig. 4. Monitoring tool deployment
B. Additional Functionalities
In section II-B, we highlighted several attacks possible
against the Neighbor Discovery Protocol. Monitoring only
the classic Neighbor Discovery activities is not sufficient for
detecting these addresses. But to detect these attacks, besides
the neighbors’ cache, we must also defined the legitimate
behavior for the routing on the link. By defining the routers’
Ethernet and IPv6 valid addresses, and the legitimate prefixes
on the link, we can detect the following attacks:
• wrong router mac: the Ethernet source address of the
Router Advertisement is not defined as valid
• wrong router ip: the IPv6 source address of the Router
Advertisement is not defined as valid
• wrong prefix: the prefix advertised in the Router Adver-
tisement is not legitimate on the link
• wrong router redirect: the source of the Redirect message
is not a legitimate router
• NA router flag: the Neighbor Advertisement has the
Router flag set whereas it is not defined in the known
routers list
• DAD DoS: Denial of Service toward the Duplicate Ad-
dress Detection mechanism
• ethernet broadcast: the Ethernet source address is the
broadcast address
• ip broadcast: the IPv6 source address is a specific multi-
cast address
When detected, all these behaviors trigger the sending of
syslog and mails alerts. Some of them are not only the
manifestation of a malicious behavior or a misconfiguration,
they symbolize vulnerabilities in the IPv6 stack. For example,
depending on the version of the Linux kernel, and thus of the
IPv6 stack, it is possible or not to assign an Ethernet broadcast
address on an interface. If such a behavior is detected, it means
that the host on which this address is set has an old version
of the IPv6 stack, and that it could be judicious to update it.
C. Integration in a monitoring framework
This architecture is aimed at being integrated in a wider
monitoring framework based on NetSV 2, the IPv6 Network
2http://netsv.sourceforge.net
Renumbering SuperVision tool. NetSV monitors the renum-
bering procedure and validates the addressing of end hosts.
Our architecture monitors the Neighbor Discovery Protocol
activities and detects some attacks against this protocol. The
renumbering procedure is based on this protocol. Our architec-
ture can thus be used to give more precise informations about
the network’s state, and help NetSV to validate the transitions
between the different steps of the procedure. By working
together, NetSV and our monitoring architecture provide a
more complete monitoring of the renumbering procedure, and
make possible to detect attacks performed by a malicious host
to prevent the renumbering from succeeding.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTS
In this section we present the implementation of our archi-
tecture that we described previously, and the tests performed
to validate the tool. The tool is called NDPMon, Neighbor
Discovery Protocol Monitor.
A. Implementation
The software, we called NDPMon, has been implemented
in C language, must be launched with root privileges and
runs as a daemon. To limit as much as possible the resources
consumption, we performed some code profiling with the tool
ValGrind 3. NDPMon uses two XML files which are parsed
and modified by libxml2 4 (cf Figure 5).
The first file is the configuration file which contains two
main parts. Firstly, there are some options for the configuration
of the daemon itself: syslog facility to use, Email address
for the reports... Secondly, the administrator must give the
list of the legitimate routers on the link (Ethernet and IPv6
addresses) and a list of network prefixes authorized. These
informations are used by the daemon as the legitimate routing
informations on the link, and are used as references when
Neighbor Discovery packets are received.
The second file is the neighbor cache. It contains the
pairings between IPv6 and Ethernet addresses. A Timestamp is
set for each entry in the cache. This file is filled automatically
by the daemon. If NDPMon runs in learning phase, this
database will be constructed without sending any report.
When the tool is launched, these two files are parsed. The
neighbor cache is loaded and the entries are convert in C
structures. The routing informations in the configuration file
are converted in the same way. The daemon begins to listen to
the network and captures Neighbor Discovery packets thanks
to the libpcap 5. These packets are converted in C structures.
The tool implements analysis functions to verify if the packet
is legitimate, or if it is a malicious packet (as defined in section
IV).
If the packet is considered as malicious, reports are sent
via syslog, and, depending on the severity, a mail is sent to
the administrator. If the packet is legitimate, the informations
it contains are added in the neighbor cache if they are not
3http://valgrind.org/
4http://xmlsoft.org/
5http://www.tcpdump.org/
Fig. 5. Implementation Architecture
already present, otherwise the Timestamp of the corresponding
is simply updated.
B. Validation Tests
To validate each monitoring feature described in section
IV, NDPMon underwent an experimental validation. In this
section, we will present a scenario in which NDPMon is
deployed and running on a link, and detects some attacks.
The IPv6 Hacking Tools 6 have been used to generate the
attacks. It is a set of tools to attack inherent protocol weakness
of IPv6 and ICMPv6. It provides an easy to use API to write
small programs to simulate Neighbor Discovery attacks thanks
to the included packet factory library. Moreover, some pre-
written executable to generate basic ICMPv6, and especially
Neighbor Discovery, messages are available, which makes fast
and easy the tests.
Let’s consider a basic network, with one router and three
IPv6 nodes, as shown in figure 6.
At startup, NDPMon first builds the neighbors’ cache. Here
follows the syslog reports generated by the daemon:
NDPMon[26345]: new station 0:30:b6:51:d4:1c \
fe80::230:b6ff:fe51:d41c
NDPMon[26345]: new station 0:13:72:14:c4:58 \
fe80::213:72ff:fe14:c458
NDPMon[26345]: new station 0:11:11:4d:82:0 \
fe80::211:11ff:fe4d:8200
NDPMon[26345]: new station 0:13:72:14:c4:58 \
fe80::213:72ff:fe14:c458
Fig. 6. Validation testbed
6http://www.thc.org/thc-ipv6/
As long as the network remains in that state, no new
reports will be sent. In the rest of the section, all reports
shown are syslog messages. Thanks to the IPv6 hacking tools,
the attacker can begin to send spoofed Neighbor Discovery
messages. In the following example, the attacker sends a fake
router advertisement, by spoofing the router’s Ethernet and
IPv6 addresses, but with an invalid network prefix:
root@attacker:˜/thc-ipv6-0.7# ./fake_router6 eth0 \
fe80::230:b6ff:fe51:d41c 2001:660:4501:3201::/64 \
1500 0:30:b6:51:d4:1c
The victim will accept the Router Advertisement as it is
well formed, and consider the prefix 2001:660:4501:3201::/64
is on-link. NDPMon receives the message, and compares
the informations contained to its database with the analysis
functions. The Ethernet and IPv6 source addresses are valid,
but the prefix is not legitimate on the link. Thus, it will send
a report by mail to the administrator and write the following
message in syslog:
Warning: wrong prefix 2001:660:4501:3201 \
0:30:b6:51:d4:1c fe80::230:b6ff:fe51:d41c
Thanks to these tools, we tested all the attacks presented in
section IV, except for the assignment of an Ethernet broadcast
address. To test it, we used the following sequence on the
attacker:
root@attacker:˜/# ifconfig eth0 down
root@attacker:˜/# ifconfig eth0 hw ether ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
root@attacker:˜/# ifconfig eth0 up
When the interface is set to up again, the attacker sends a
Neighbor Advertisement with this broadcast address as source.
It is detected by NDPMon:
Warning: ethernet broadcast ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0
The attacker is running a Linux 2.6.15 kernel, which allows
to set such an address on an interface. The victim is running a
newer version of the kernel (2.6.17), and thus of the IPv6 stack,
which does not allow such an operation. As NDPMon detects
such behavior, it makes possible to identify hosts running
outdated IPv6 stacks, and which could be vulnerable to more
attacks, and may require an update.
VI. PLANNED EXTENSIONS
The first prototype of NDPMon has been released in
September 2006 and its development is pursued within the
team. Some extensions are already planned. In IPv6, a node
has exactly one link-local address, but can have more than one
global address. At the moment, in NDPMon, for each pairing
Ethernet and IPv6 address (link-local or global), one entry is
present in the cache. The data structure will be updated to
be more compliant to IPv6’s standards. In the same way, the
legitimate routing informations are defined in three different
lists: a list of Ethernet addresses, a list of IPv6 addresses and
a list of authorized IPv6 prefixes. These three lists will be
combined in a single list of routers, with as attribute: the
Ethernet address, the IPv6 link-local and eventually global
addresses, and a list of prefixes advertised by the router.
Thanks to this improvement, we will be able to make a more
accurate description of the legitimate routing infrastructure on
the link, and detect more attacks or misconfigurations.
Moreover, NDPMon includes a learning phase where the
tool learns the network’s default behavior. But this learning
phase only fills the neighbor cache. We will extend it and also
fill the routers’ list automatically.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that, if the Neighbor Discovery
Protocol is an important building block in IPv6, it is also
vulnerable to attacks or misconfigurations. Since approaches
for securing this protocol, are very complex to deploy in real
networks, we proposed a monitoring architecture based on
what exists in the IPv4 world, while extending it.
We presented a working prototype developed in our team,
NDPMon 7. NDPMon is distributed under the LGPL license
and available on SourceForge 8 project. This tool is easy
to deploy and configure, and is able to detect many attacks
against the Neighbor Discovery Protocol or IPv6 stacks vul-
nerabilities.
The development NDPMon will be continued within the
team, and improvements will be brought to it. We are working
on the distribution of the tool in the Debian 9 GNU/Linux
distribution.
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